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Summary
The paper examines the efficiency of alternative road pricing schemes when an alternative railroad
service is available. The paper uses a model, developed by Tabuchi (1993), in which road transport
presents a bottleneck congestion technology while railroad transport shows economies of scale with
respect to the number of train users. The competition between the two modes is assumed to be on
cost basis only. It is found that if the railroad fare is set equal to the average cost, the relative
efficiency of the regimes depends on parameters' values. The numerical simulation shows that the
fine toll regime is generally to be preferred to the alternative regimes but when the fixed railroad
cost are large enough so that the inefficient exploitation of the scale economies is less than
compensated by the toll revenue.
Non technical summary
Road congestion takes place when the number of users exceed the road capacity. It entails a cost
(loss of time) to the car user who enters the road and to all car users who are on the road.
Consequently, it represents a private and social cost. Economic theory suggests that excess
congestion derives from a lack of perception of the costs involved due to the lack of a price signal.
Road pricing would potentially send the right signal to users. Because of practical reasons, road
pricing is scarcely implemented and, in particular, it is not implemented as the theory suggests. The
toll is not perfectly time-dependent, but it is often fixed or it differentiates between peak and off-
peak periods. The paper focuses on the efficiency of such toll systems when an alternative railroad
transport mode is available. Railroad transport shows economies of scale.
Such problem has not receive wide attention in the literature. We focus our analysis to the case
when rail transport is priced on the basis of average costs in order to cover all costs. The application
of a average-cost pricing rule to railroad transport is known as a theoretically sub-optimal pricing
rule, but it is interesting to study as second best case which might take place in reality if rail is
privatised. On the contrary, Tabuchi (1993) analysed the case when the rail transport fare is set
equal to marginal costs.
Tabuchi (1993) concludes that there is a definite ranking of the road toll regimes and shows that the
social optimum is reached with the perfectly-time dependent toll system. We find that if the average
cost pricing rule is applied to railroad transport the relative efficiency of the regimes is not definite
and depends on parameters' values. The crucial variable is not the number of commuters (a proxy of2
the city size) but the amount of fixed costs (a proxy of the type of infrastructure). For a large
enough value of the railroad fixed cost, the finer the toll system the greater are the total cost of the
transport system as a whole because the inefficient exploitation of the scale economies is less than
compensated by the toll revenue.3
1 Introduction
This paper revisits the article by Tabuchi (1993) “Bottleneck Congestion and Modal Split” in which
he investigates the optimality and efficiency of several railroad fare and road toll regimes in a
model with two competing transport modes (the private car and the railroad) connecting the same
origin-destination pair
1. Road transport presents a bottleneck congestion technology while railroad
transport shows economies of scale with respect to the number of commuters due to the fixed
infrastructure. Competition between the two modes is assumed to be on cost-basis only, with an
inelastic total demand and with the two modes being perfect substitutes.
Tabuchi states that the set of road toll policies is analysed while at the same time setting the railroad
fare on a cost basis (i.e., equal to the average cost). But this is not what it is performed in the formal
derivation. Formally, Tabuchi applies to railroad transport the marginal cost-pricing rule. This
paper follows Tabuchi’s stated proposal and formally derives the modal split and the total cost
when applying the average cost pricing rule to railroad transport and applying to road transport four
alternative toll regimes: no toll, a fine toll, a coarse toll and a uniform toll. The application of a
average-cost pricing rule to railroad transport is known as a theoretically sub-optimal pricing rule,
but it is interesting to study as second best case which might take place in reality if rail is privatised.
Tabuchi (1993) concludes that there is a definite ranking of the regimes and shows that the social
optimum is reached with the fine toll system
2. Unlike Tabuchi, we find that if the average cost
pricing rule is applied to railroad transport the relative efficiency of the regimes is not definite and
depends on parameters' values. The crucial variable is not the number of commuters (a proxy of the
city size) but the amount of fixed costs (a proxy of the type of infrastructure). For a large enough
value of the railroad fixed cost, the finer the toll system the greater are the total cost of the transport
system as a whole because the inefficient exploitation of the scale economies is less than
compensated by the toll revenue.
The bottleneck congestion model is briefly presented in Section 1, the interaction between road and
railroad transport is modelled in Section 2. Section 3 is devoted to a numerical simulation and to a
test of the sensitivity of the results to changes in the parameters’ values. Conclusions and extensions
are discussed in Section 4.
2 The bottleneck congestion model
The bottleneck congestion model has been formally developed by various authors (Newell, 1987;
Braid, 1989; Arnott, de Palma and Lindsey (hereafter ADL), 1990b, 1993) along the lines traced by
Vickery (1969). Several model extensions have been studied (ADL 1990a, 1991, 1992, 1994). The
essential feature of the bottleneck congestion model is that it allows for endogenous scheduling so
that each individual can choose, for example, whether to enter a queue (incurring in high travel
costs) or to postpone his departure (incurring in high schedule-delay costs) depending on his
preferences. The model then becomes dynamic in nature with novel and important implications for
optimal pricing policies since the information provided by a system of congestion charges may alter
queue formation and reduce congestion costs (which are proven to be a pure deadweight loss).
                                                       
1 The interaction between the private car and public transport has long been debated in the literature. In the 70's,
Sherman (1971, 1972), Baum (1973) and Jackson (1975) discussed the opportunity of partially or totally subsidising
public transport to reduce road congestion. Dorling et al. (1974) instead advocated the symmetrical policy issue of
using road tolls for reversing the decline of public transport without presenting a formal model. Small (1983) and Viton
(1983, 1986) studied the design of optimal tolls on an urban highway jointly used by an express bus service. Glaister
and Lewis (1978) and De Borger et al. (1986) developed an urban passenger transport model to calculate optimal tolls
taking into consideration three modes (the private car, the bus and the rail-service), three external cost sources
(congestion, environmental degradation and accidents), distributional aspects and pricing constraints.
2 He also discusses the opportunity of having a railroad system with different city sizes.4
The bottleneck model is mainly focused on the journey-to-work trip and assumes that N individuals
commute to work from a residential area to the Central Business District along the same road.
Travel is uncongested but at a single bottleneck through which at most s cars can pass per unit of
time; if the arrival rate at the bottleneck exceeds s, a queue develops. Congestion technology is
therefore of the bottleneck type opposed to a flow congestion technology
3. Referring to ADL
(1993) for a detailed derivation of the model, we just recall that four types of equilibria can be
derived: a no-toll equilibrium, a uniform-toll equilibrium, a coarse-toll equilibrium and fine-toll
equilibrium. Let us recall the meaning of each equilibrium and the main results.
With no toll, ADL (1993) show that total travel cost TC, which is the sum of total travel time cost




























































Note that queuing time in this model is pure deadweight loss. As ADL explain "If the departure
rate were set at s between tq and tq', queuing would be eliminated. Furthermore, since the time
pattern of arrivals would be the same as in the no-toll equilibrium, total schedule delay cost would
be unchanged. Thus, the social saving from the change would equal total travel time cost in the no-
toll equilibrium, which equals one-half of total travel cost". This example highlights the potential
improvements in welfare that could be made by using a toll to induce a change in the time pattern
of  departures.
As a matter of fact, if we impose a fine toll (i.e. a time-varying toll) a social optimum can be















where the superscript o denotes the social optimum. Average total travel cost ATC and marginal












                                                       
3 The latter type of congestion technology assumes that there is congestion outside the bottleneck as well and is related














The toll starts from zero, then it increases linearly from tq (the most recent time at which there is no
queue) to t
* (the desired time of arrival at work) and decreases linearly from t
* to tq' (the end of the
rush hour). The average toll equals the average travel cost
4.
On the contrary a uniform toll adds a constant fee to each trip and therefore does not alter the

















u u ATC MSC 2 =
For efficiency, the price of a trip should be equal to marginal social price thus
(2.11)
u u u u C MSC p t + = =
(2.12)
u u ATC = t
A coarse toll (e.g. a toll with a peak and an off-peak fare) is more efficient that a uniform toll since
it alters the departure time, but it does not completely eliminate queuing. ADL (1990) show that
(2.13) ( )
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and where the superscript c denotes the coarse toll.
To summarise, the supply function in the four regimes would then be equal to









                                                       
4 In fact, for efficiency each traveller should pay marginal social cost which equals twice the average cost. In the
absence of the queue the person who arrives on time faces zero travel cost and should therefore pay the maximum toll
which equals twice the average travel cost. On the contrary the persons who depart first and last incur twice the average
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Let now the demand function be




Equation (2.15) and (2.16) imply that (Fig. 1)
(2.17)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) s p s p s p s p
e o c u ) ) ) ) = > >
which, with variable demand as in (2.16), in turn imply
(2.18)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) s N s N s N s N
e o c u ) ) ) )
= < <
Fig. 1 – Equilibria with alternative pricing regimes in a bottleneck congestion model.
The explanation of the first inequality is as follows. For a given number of travellers, the price of a
trip is lowest for the no-toll equilibrium (since no toll is charged) and the fine-toll equilibrium
(since travel on the road is efficient)
5, intermediate for the coarse-toll equilibrium and highest for
the uniform-toll equilibrium. For a decreasing demand function the inequality (2.18) follows.
3 Congestion and public transport
                                                       
5 The coincidence of the no-toll and fine-toll supply functions reflects the particular congestion technology assumed.
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) s N s N s N s N
















Let us now suppose that a railroad connecting the residential area to the CBD is available as an
alternative commuting mode. The N commuters could then be divided among automobile
commuters Na and train commuters Nb.  The sum of the two is fixed (N) and commuting is a must.




c Cb + =
where c is the marginal cost per commuter, which might include the increase in operative costs and
the marginal boarding and alighting time costs
 , and F is the fixed cost. As the number of train
commuters increase Cb decreases. Let us assume the modal equilibrium to be characterised by
(3.2a) 0 > = b b a N for C C
(3.2b) 0 = < b b a N for C C
when (3.2a) holds both modes are in use, when (3.2b) holds the car is the only commuting mode.
Such an equilibrium condition is rather crude. Being based on costs only, it implies that the cross-
elasticity of demand between transport and other goods is negligible
6 and that there is perfect
substitution among road and rail transport. Such bimodal equilibrium has been termed in the
literature as a Wardrop Modal Equilibrium (Williams, 1998; and Mackie and Bonsall, 1989). It has
been shown to be a limiting case of the general multimodal equilibrium and to allow for the Downs-
Thomson-Mogridge paradox when highway capacity is expanded
7.
Moreover, it does not consider the time cost involved in waiting on riding the train as in Mohring
(1972).
Under such hypothesis, total social cost of the transport system is then
(3.3a) 0 > + = b b b a a N for N C N C TC
(3.3b) 0 = = b a a N for N C TC
We now derive the equilibrium conditions using equation (3.2) and estimate the total social cost
using equation (3.3) in four different regimes: a regime of average cost pricing (cost-based fare) for
train commuting and no toll for auto commuting (subsection 3.1); a regime of average cost pricing
and fine toll (subsection 3.2); a regime of average cost pricing and coarse toll (subsection 3.3); and
a regime of average cost pricing and uniform toll (subsection 3.4).
It seem interesting to analyse a situation in which the congestion externality is either not
internalised, perfectly internalised or imperfectly internalised while the optimal marginal cost
pricing rule in not applied in the railroad mode. It corresponds to sub-optimal situation when public
transport is deregulated or privatised.
3.1 Average cost pricing with no road toll
If the railroad fare p
a is set equal to its average cost and there is no road toll, the equilibrium
numbers of respective user is
                                                       
6 As Tabuchi (1993, p. 418) underlines, although total demand N=Na + Nb is fixed, modal demand is not and is
endogenously determined.
d sp N Nb - =
where p is the railroad fare, which might be equal to the average cost on a zero loss basis or below the average cost if a
loss is acceptable.
7 If the Wardrop Modal Equilibrium applies, an highway expansion meant to relief congestion leads paradoxically to
increase both congestion and public transport costs (Downs, 1962; Thomson, 1977, Mogridge, 1990).8
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where  d cs sF N + = 2 ˆ is the value which equals the square root to zero.
Below  N ˆ only road is in use. Above   N ˆ both road and railroad are in use and the costs of building
and operating the railroad are covered.  N ˆ could be interpreted as a (city or corridor) threshold
above which it makes economic sense to build a railroad. Note that Nb cannot be small in
equilibrium because the fixed cost F in the railroad sector would not be covered. Therefore, the
distribution is discontinuous at  N N ˆ = . As N gets larger, the distribution remains (N,0) for small N,




a N N , at  N N ˆ = .
Since auto commuting has external diseconomies while train commuting has external economies, it
is well known that this distribution does not achieve a social optimum.





















3.2 Average cost pricing with a fine road toll
If the railroad fare p
a is set equal to its average cost and there is a fine road toll, which on average
equals the ATC, the equilibrium numbers of respective user is equal to the previous case. So is the
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Such derivation and those in subsection 3.3 and 3.4 are the main differences with Tabuchi (1993, p.
425-7). In fact, Tabuchi obtains the socially optimum number of road users equating the MSC of
road users to the MC of train users, although he states that he wants to analyse the same  problem.
On the contrary, we obtained the modal split whereby users are comparing the MSC of using the
road with the AC of using the train (railway fares are assumed to be cost-based), therefore obtaining
a different set of TC formulations and different conclusions
8.
3.3 Average cost pricing with a coarse road toll
If the railroad fare p
a is set equal to its average cost and there is a coarse toll on road users, the
equilibrium numbers of respective user is
                                                       










N N for N
N N for




2 4 2 4 2
,

























- - + =
yd yd yd yd yd yd
where 
yd yd 2 2
2 ˆ cs sF
N



























> - + =
d
yd
3.4 Average cost pricing with a uniform road toll
If the railroad fare p
a is set equal to its average cost and there is a uniform toll on road users, the
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When N is fixed the inequalities (2.25) for auto commuters
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imply the opposite inequalities for train commuters (Fig. 2)
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Fig. 2 – Bimodal equilibria with alternative road pricing schemes.
It follows from (3.35), (3.36), (3.37) and (3.38) that the TC gross of toll revenue (i.e., the initial cost
to commuters) is certainly








b = < <
This result deserves some discussion. It appears that the finer the toll system the higher will be the
total cost (gross of toll revenue) of the transport system as a whole. ADL (1991), considering a
road-only system, arrive at an opposite conclusion, that is, the finer the toll system the lower are the
total cost of the (road-only) system.
The reason is that a finer toll system, accommodating more auto commuters on the road, causes a
lower exploitation of the economies of scale inherent to railroad technology. But if one considers
the TC net of toll revenue (after the revenue is invested), the ranking is not certain because the
inefficient exploitation of the economies of scale due to the finer toll system might be offset by a
larger revenue generation (higher toll along with a larger number of auto commuters).
In order to study the relative efficiency of the four regimes we use the following index









4 A numerical simulation
railroad users
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) s N s N s N s N



















As a numerical example we have assumed for a, b and g the values proposed in ADL (1993). N is
set equal to 20,000 commuters/hr and road capacity s to 8000 vehicles/hr so that rush hour lasts 2.5
hours. The marginal cost of train is assumed to be 1.46$ and the fixed cost for capital 0.2$ per rider
as in Straszheim (1979) calculation for Philadelphia.
Table 1 – Base case
Parameter values : a= $5/hr, b=$3.05/hr, g=$11.88/hr, c=1.46, s=8000, F=440, N=20,000 commuters
No toll Fine toll Coarse toll Uniform toll
Auto users 4908 4908 3468 2447
Train users 15091 15091 16531 17552
Average social cost,
average railroad cost
1.489 1.489 1.486 1.485
Average toll 0 0.744 0.743 0.742
Gross total cost 29,783 29,783 29,732 29,701
Total cost net of toll
revenue
29,783 26.128 27153 27,883
On the basis of these values the ranking of TCg of equation (3.12) is confirmed, while the ranking
of the TC net of toll revenue is as follows
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The toll regimes have a lower TC with respect to the untolled one and the finer the regime the lower
the net total cost. It is interesting now to test the stability of the inequality (4.1) to a change in the
number of commuters (as a proxy of the city size) and to a change in the amount of fixed costs (as a
proxy of the type of infrastructure).
Varying the number of commuters N
When the number of commuters N is increased the relative efficiency indicator  (3.13) behaves as in
fig. 3.12
Fig. 3 – Efficiency of alternative regimes with an increasing number of commuters N.
If we start from a situation in which TCf<TCc<TCu , for increasing values of N the following could
be observed:
- the efficiency of the uniform-toll regime is always lower than that of the coarse-toll one, which
in turn is always lower than that of the fine-toll regime. Nb increases and Na decreases due to the
effect of the economies of scale so that the modal split shifts in favour of public transport. The
equilibrium average cost decreases. There are no forces at work for an inversion in the ranking;
- the relative efficiency of the untolled and coarse-toll regime with respect to the fine-toll one
decreases because the railroad average cost curve shows a greater elasticity when it crosses the
fine toll cost curve than when it crosses the coarse-toll or uniform toll curves. The greater
elasticity can be interpreted as a stronger ability of the signal provided by the fine toll to induce
a mode shift with respect to the other two charging systems. Moreover, such superior ability is
more evident as N starts increasing since the reduction in the average costs is decreasing with
N.
Varying the amount of fixed capital F
When the amount of fixed capital F is increased from the starting value of 440 to 15000 the TC































Fig. 4 – Efficiency of alternative regimes with increasing fixed costs F.
The most noticeable result is that, for sufficiently high values of F, the starting TC ranking is
reversed. It can be observed that







The reason is that, while for low values of F the lower exploitation of the economies of scale in
fine-toll regime with respect to the coarse-toll and uniform-toll ones is more than compensated by
the greater amount of revenues generated, whereas for sufficiently high values of F the opposite is
true. The high or low values of F might be interpreted as two types of rail infrastructure, e.g., a light
rail train or an underground train. The inversion takes place if there are substantial economies of
scale to be gained which might suggest an over-investment in the infrastructure. To summarise, the
conclusion is that the finer the toll systems the lower the total net cost, but for a high enough value
of F. In such a case, relieving congestion through a fine toll leads to higher (average and total) costs
compared to using a rough uniform toll.
Such result is similar to Williams’s statement (Williams, 1998) that the Downs-Thomson-Mogridge
paradox (higher road and public transport costs as a result of an highway expansion meant to relief
congestion) takes place when the economies of scale are large (i.e., F is large)
9. The difference
being that our result is determined both by the economies of scale and by the toll revenue.
Conclusions and extensions
Refining the model by Tabuchi (1993), this paper examined the efficiency properties of alternative
road pricing schemes when a competing railroad service is available. It is found that, opposite to
what Tabuchi concludes, when the railroad fare is set equal to the average cost pricing there is no
definite ranking of the regimes. It cannot be stated a priori that a fine-toll regime is preferable to a
coarse-toll or to a uniform-toll one on the basis of the total costs of the transport system as a whole,
as it could be stated when only a road transport system is considered (ADL, 1990).
                                                       
9 Williams (1997) show also that when the economies of scale are very high (when the elasticity of the road cost curve
























The crucial variable appears to be not the number of commuters N (the city size) but the cost of the
fixed infrastructure because of the presence of economies of scale. For sufficiently high values of F
and assuming a bottleneck congestion technology, a finer toll system performs worse than the
alternative rougher charging systems. This is because it allows more auto users to stay on the road
and consequently does not sufficiently exploit the economies of scale inherent to the railroad,
notwithstanding the larger toll revenue generated. Such case might be seen in practise when a very
costly railroad infrastructure has been chosen either because no alternative was available or because
of a wrong investment decision.
The result rests on a sort of Wardrop modal equilibrium hypothesis which could be refined by
accounting for the railroad users’ time cost and for their trade-off between riding packed trains in
rush hour times or waiting for the next train. In a general equilibrium setting with variable demand
and positive own- and cross-elasticities it would be possible to capture further relevant factors,
though at a cost of adding a lot of complexity to the model.
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